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The positive effects of new innovative entry and fast and efficient allocation of resources 
are balanced against the efficiency of price signaling in markets in a non-linear micro 
based simulation model of an Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE). In this model 
increasingly rapid reallocation of resources over markets, moved by innovative new entry 
and competitive exit (the rate of firm turnover) generates faster growth in output, but 
eventually, if too fast, is shown to affect the reliability of price signaling in markets and to 
raise the frequency of investment mistakes. Beyond a certain level of the rate of firm 
turnover the aggregate effects at the macro level, therefore, turn negative. This optimal 
growth trajectory depends on the balance between the rates of entry and exit and on the 
performance of new firms compared to incumbents, their size compared to incumbents and 
the variation in the same characteristics. 
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1.  The dynamics of resource allocation in an experimentally organized  
 Economy 
The experimentally organized economy (Eliasson 1987, 1991a, 1996) is characterized by 
an extremely large and heterogeneous state space (investment opportunities set) into which 
boundedly rational agents (firms) guided by tacit knowledge search for opportunities. This 
search is also an act of learning and creative discovery such that new opportunities are 
created and the opportunity set expands as it is being explored. The paradoxical result 
emerges that “we” may become increasingly ignorant about all that can be learned about 
(the Särimner effect, Eliasson 1987, 1990b. pp 46f, 1996 p. 27f). Hence, the economy 
behaves at each point in time as for all practical purposes an open ended system. Growth is 
highly non-linear in new technological discovery and occurs through experimental 
selection through the entry of new firms, forcing reorganization and rationalization or exit 
on incumbent firms. We call this Schumpeterian Creative Destruction (Table 1) and 
propose the existence of an initially positive relationship between the rate of firm turnover 
(the number of entries and exits in relation to the total number of firms), that may, above 
some fast and unbalanced rate disturb price signaling in markets and turn negative. The 
internal conflict between stabilizing and equilibrating properties works itself through the 
economic system (Eliasson 1983,1984). Such phenomena go theoretically undiscovered in 
the mainstream neoclassical model. They may involve such extreme disturbances that 
never, or rarely, occur in reality, or involve such long-term non-linear relationships that 
they will not be possible to capture econometrically. To establish the possible theoretical 
existence of such a long-term downside of Schumpeterian creative destruction only 
simulation analysis will do.  
 
Schumpeterian Creative Destruction 
We study the macroeconomic effects of firm turnover in this Schumpeterian creative 
destruction process (Table 1) in which macroeconomic growth is moved by experimental 
selection. We use a model version of the EOE, the Swedish micro-to-macro model called 
MOSES. For our purposes this model economy has two fundamental properties. 
(1)  With a huge and complex state space the opportunities for very large systems 
productivity effects through dynamic reallocation of resources are significant. Much of that 
reorganization occurs through the entry and exit of firms (Eliasson 1991a,b, Johansson 
2001, Eliasson – Taymaz 2000). 
(2)  The faster resources are being reallocated through entry and exit, other forms of 
organizational change, however, the faster structural change in the economy and the more 
unreliable price signaling in markets, causing in turn an increase in costly mistaken 
business decisions with a small learning content, and a negative effect on growth (Eliasson 
1983, 1984, 1991a). Hence, there are increasing negative returns to increased search 
(“learning”) of state space (the investment opportunity set; Eliasson 1990a) as agents 
attempt to probe state space faster in the short-run to reach even higher economic systems 
productivity levels (Eliasson 1989, 2001). These negative returns to too fast learning occur 
because the coordination mechanism of the model economy (price signaling in markets) is 
disturbed, price signals becoming increasingly unreliable and causing an increased rate of   3
mistaken decisions. The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the existence of this 
effect.
1 
Starting from zero entry of firms and increasing it we would, hence, expect an increasingly 
positive outcome to begin with, which will eventually begin to decline. When almost all 
firms are changed through entry and exit each period output might even be smaller than in 
the no turnover case. Somewhere in between there is a maximum. In the short run the 
hypothesis of positive effects of firm gross turnover can be tested econometrically. 
Johansson (2001) has also found econometric support for a positive linear relationship. The 
long-run curvature hypothesis, however, is not tractable by econometric analysis and for 
two reasons. First, time series data of sufficient length to reveal the non-linear property are 
simply not available. Second, the time span we now consider will include so many 
interactive influences that the model needed to capture them and keep them apart will 
probably be beyond econometric analysis. It may be the case that the negative influences 
begin to show so early that agents, including policy makers, begin to react to counter these 
effects. If so, this analysis becomes a pure theoretical inquiry into the possible existence of 
such a negative effect in a controlled experiment. In such a controlled experiment (Eliasson 
1991a, Eliasson-Johansson-Taymaz 2004), we expect a situation of chaotic behavior to 
emerge. Under normal circumstances agents make mistakes and respond to mistakes and 
the economic system at large is self-regulating. Above a certain rate of turnover, however, 
this self-regulation begins to malfunction and a slow destabilizing momentum begins to 
cumulate. At the macro level of forecasters the economic system, however, sends no alarm 
signals until a strong surge of negative macroeconomic influences begins to show.  
This long-run dynamic property of the EOE becomes analytically tractable in the model 
approximation of the EOE, i.e. in MOSES. Macroeconomic change in the MOSES model 
economy occurs through the Schumpeterian creative destruction process of Table 1. For 
this to be a positive growth experience, however, there has to be a balance in firm turnover 
between entry (item 1 ) and exit (item 4). In reality this probably means that innovative 
entry initiates competition that forces incumbent firms to reorganize their business and 
failing firms to exit and that the exit process is not curbed by industrial policy but rather 
facilitated (Eliasson 2000, Eliasson-Taymaz 2000). We would, hence, expect a non-linear 
relation between the rate of firm turnover and long-run economic growth under certain, 
perhaps quite general circumstances. For low rates of turnover and short periods the 
relationship should appear positive and approximately linear as demonstrated in 
econometric tests (Johansson 2001). The same relation should, however, be non-linear over 
the longer term, eventually to turn negative. 
This hypothesized non-linear relationship has been econometrically tested on data 
generated by repeated simulation experiments on the MOSES micro-to-macro model of the 
Swedish economy. Incentives for entrepreneurial entry have been gradually raised and the 
simulated long-run effects on total output recorded. The hypothesis is that the disturbed 
price signaling in markets increases with the rate of turnover and structural change and that 
the effects on total output changes from a positive to a negative one somewhere in between 
                                                 
1 A brief presentation of the micro-to-macro model tailored for our particular experiments is found in 
Eliasson – Taymaz (2000) and Eliasson-Johansson-Taymaz (2004). A more principal presentation is found in 
Eliasson (1977, 1978a, 1991a and 1992,) .The macro economic effects of disturbed price signaling in markets 
due to inflation were studied in (Eliasson 1978b).  In addition there are five MOSES books, (1) The Firm and 
Financial Markets in the Swedish Micro-to-macro Model (Eliasson 1985), (2) MOSES Handbook (Bergholm 
1989), (3) MOSES Code (Albrecht et al. 1989, (4) MOSES on PC – Manual, Initialization and Calibration 
(Taymaz 1991) and (5) MOSES Database (Albrecht et al. 1992); all five published by IUI, Stockholm.    4
no entry and a complete turnover of all firms each period
2. We also hypothesize that the 
negative influence on long-run growth will occur faster, (1) the faster firm turnover and (2) 
the more unbalanced the entry and exit process. 
To carry out these experiments we have used the latest version of the MOSES model of the 
EOE with endogenous R&D generation of innovations and genetic learning of firms from 
one another (Ballot – Taymaz 1998, 1999). This model has been calibrated against 
historical long-term development of the Swedish economy using an early method of 




On non-duality and unreliable price signaling  
The experiments we are considering can only be performed on a model economy that is 
operationally defined outside static equilibrium and that has no exogenous equilibrium as 
conventionally defined. Its equilibrium properties have to be defined differently and should 
rather be discussed in terms of economic systems stability (Eliasson 1983, 1984). In static 
equilibrium duality prevails. Prices map exactly into quantities and quantities map exactly 
into prices. Non-duality can only be analyzed on the static general equilibrium model for 
infinitesimal departures from that same equilibrium to which the system always returns 
(converges) i.e., to the original (same) equilibrium, or almost there (“practical stability”, 
La Salle – Lefschetz 1961). This rubber-band fixed-point based equilibrium analysis does 
not recognize time and the possibility that the system, because of its departure from static 
equilibrium may go “elsewhere”.
4 This non-convergence property is, however, to be 
expected in an economy where information use and communications activities dominate 
resource use and where technological change in computing and communications (C&C) 
technology dominates total productivity change through constant systems reorganization 
(Eliasson 1990b). Hence, to analyze the systems instabilities generated by endogenously 
disturbed price signaling in markets that removes price taking behavior of individual 
agents from the model we need a “ different” non-linear micro-to-macro model such as 
MOSES. We argue this point by way of a critical survey of neoclassical exogenous 
equilibrium growth models that claim to capture real life creative destruction and the role 
of firm dynamics in economic growth. 
When entrants are characterized by very large diversity of performance, and are not 
necessarily better than incumbents on the average new (and young) firms tend to perish at 
                                                 
2 Cf. Eliasson (1978b) where the macro economic growth process is fairly unaffected by such disturbances 
caused by inflation up to a certain level, then to turn negative. 
3 Complex economic models involve a number of unobservable parameters. These parameters are either 
estimated statistically from reduced form models, or, in most of the cases, substituted by researchers’ best 
“educated guests”. The way the parameter values are set has been one of the main reasons why these models 
has been ignored and even disregarded as a robust analytical tool by orthodox economists. However, we have 
developed a calibration algorithm to set parameter values for the MOSES model at the early stages of model 
development (Taymaz 1991b). This calibration or structural estimation program, based on a random hill 
climbing algorithm, fits the “model” to a number of sectoral variables, but it can also use micro-variables for 
calibrating parameter values. As shown by Balistreri and Hillberry (2004), estimation and calibration 
exercises are identical under consistent identifying assumptions. Both methods fit a model to data. Therefore, 
one should not consider econometric models as a superior analytical tool. In terms of fitting the data, there is 
no difference between econometric models and simulation models. However, simulation models allow the 
researcher to model underlying interaction mechanisms and, hence, a robust analysis.  
4 For a discussion of this “chaotic property” see Eliasson (1983, pp. 274 ff).   5
a higher rate than older incumbents. This property of the model is compatible with 
evidence reported in literature and in Johansson (2001). 
When entrants are very much better and very large and variance in performance low, the 
incumbent firms will soon perish and only the new and superior firms remain. Such a 
structure is vulnerable to unexpected change. It leaves a permanent change in the economy 
(non reversibility) and easily turns fast growth into low growth (Eliasson 1983, 1984). This 
phenomenon, however, can only be “observed” through model simulations. 
In fact, earlier model experiments have uncovered a conflict between static and dynamic 
efficiency in the sense that considerable diversity of characteristics at the firm level are a 
necessary requirement for stable and sustained macro economic growth. This does not only 
mean (Eliasson 1984, pp. 263 ff) diversity in the sense of different, but also diversity in the 
sense of more or less efficient firms (the existence of slack) and constant change at the 
micro firm level. Steady state like macroeconomic growth thus has to be supported by 
constant and “substantial Brownian motion at lower levels” (Eliasson 1984, op. cit., p. 
266), and vice versa: If that micro economic dynamics is blocked, e.g. exit prevented by 
policy, negative long-run macro economic effects will eventually begin to show. This is 
part of the phenomenon we study in this paper that is difficult and probably impossible to 
demonstrate by traditional econometric methods.   
Testing for the presence of the long-term negative influence we proceed in two steps. We 
survey the empirical literature on firm turnover to make sure that the input into the 
simulation model and its intermediary output is compatible with observed “ stylized facts” 
(next section). We then clarify the reasons for our departure from the neoclassical 
equilibrium “ growth model” through a critical survey of that literature. We then go on to 
present the alternative model of the Experimentally Organized Economy in which business 
mistakes become part of transactions costs and use it to establish the existence of a 
negative long-term relationship between the rate of (and balance of) firm turnover and 
macroeconomic growth through simulation experiments.  
 
 
2.  Stylized facts about firm turnover 
Entry, and even more so exit, for long was an avoided problem in economic theory, 
because of the mathematical difficulties of allowing for the phenomenon in neoclassical 
exogenous equilibrium models. As an empirical phenomenon it, however, unmistakenly 
exists, and some early, empirically oriented economists (Orr 1974, du Rietz 1975, 1980, 
Hause-du Rietz 1984, Highfield-Smiley, 1987, Baldwin – Gorecki 1987, 1989, 1990, Acs – 
Audretsch 1989) defied the theoretical problems and launched the needed empirical 
inquiries that made it possible to learn about the magnitudes involved in the firm turnover 
process. The econometric models estimated, however, are often only loosely related to 
mainstream economics, and normally conflict with the exogenous equilibrium properties of 
the Walras-Arrow-Debreu model
5. For this reason the interest among economists in 
                                                 
5 For a long time, and perhaps still, it was an almost mandatory part of an economics dissertation in Sweden 
to prove (not only discuss) the existence of an exogenous equilibrium in the model used for econometric or 
theoretical analysis. This is, of course, a horrendous task if the appropriate model does not, and should not 
have that property as conventionally defined. Not every doctorate candidate is capable of coming up with 
such clever mathematical tricks as Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1981) and this enforced task unduly and completely 
unnecessarily delayed the completion and publishing of du Rietz’ (1980) dissertation, a true empirical inquiry   6
entrepreneurship and new firm formation has not been overwhelming. Modigliani’s (1958) 
review article on new oligopoly theory declared that monopoly power was determined by 
the minimum size of the maximum effective plant. New entry as a competitive price 
setting factor was not even considered important. In passing that article, therefore, killed 
interest in new entry for years. For a long time conventional wisdom was (see e.g. Eriksson 
1984, p.52) that “ industry growth comes mainly from existing firms”. This observed 
(Eliasson 1991b) is either a trivial conclusion or a reflection of the short-term nature of 
economic analysis. In simulation analyses Eliasson demonstrated that entry and exit may 
not affect macro variables much in the short- term. Under reasonable assumptions, 
however, they mattered significantly in the long- run. That it took a long time for any 
significant effects of new entry to appear at the macro level had been demonstrated already 
by du Rietz (1975, p. 17 and 20). Johansson ( 2001), furthermore, showed that new and 
small firms stood for all growth in employment in the Swedish IT industry between 1993 
and 1998 while the large firms as a group significantly reduced their employment. To 
capture the long- term effects, however, simulation analysis is necessary. 
According to the neoclassical I/O story profitability in excess of equilibrium profitability 
induces entry. Hence, “ entry became seen as one of the main mechanisms by which long-
run equilibrium” is restored (Audretsch- Mata 1995), a story that is also part of Kirzner’s 
(1973) Schumpeterian type model. They are all conservative stories and consistent with the 
notion of an external equilibrium, and, hence, of little interest as a factor behind economic 
growth. Research on new entry and later firm exit was, however, stimulated and can be 
divided into two fields of inquiry; emergence, mostly an interest of non-economists and the 
firm entry, survival and later death cycle. 
Apparently the story of firm turnover and growth is a complicated one. We have to decide 
what to mean by entry and exit, which theoretical model to fit to, and help interpret the 
data reliably, and then how to bring it all together into a consistent story. We begin with 
the facts. 
 
Determinants of Entry - the emergence process 
 
While economists still have serious problems with fitting entrepreneurship into the 
standard growth model, a large group of non-economists have no such problem. They 
study the emergence of entrepreneurs and business births (and deaths) without bothering 
with such things as equilibrium prices and profits, but rather draw heavily on psychology, 
sociology, philosophy, and economic history (Gartner 1985, Katz-Gartner 1988). None of 
the members of the two schools of literature are happy to quote members of the other 
group, and this may partly, but only partly be explained by the lack of overlapping “ 
theoretical “ frameworks and difficulties to communicate. There are, however, exceptions; 
William Baumol coming in from pure economic theory (e.g. 1968, 1982, also see Eliasson-
Henrekson 2004) who early and since then consistently have attempted to integrate 
entrepreneurship and entry in the mainstream economic model; Israel Kirzner, with roots 
in Austrian-Mengerian economics (e.g. 1973, 1978, 1989). Paul Reynolds, with an equally 
pure empirical background in sociology (Reynolds 1991, 2004, Reynolds-Storey-Westhead 
                                                                                                                                                    
into the entry and exit processes in Swedish manufacturing, based on a unique empirical material. Also see 
du Rietz (1975), Englund (1980) and Hause- du Rietz (1984).   7
1994, Reynolds-Miller-Maki 1995) has been attempting for years to bring the sociological 
dimension into the economics of growth.
6 
David Birch (1979, 1981), however, appears to have been the first to focus research 
attention on the importance of new and small firms as contributors to industry growth. 
Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch have been striving since the mid 1980s to make 
economists pay attention to firm entry. A number of researchers then carried on to 
demonstrate that small firms create a disproportionably large share of new jobs (e.g. 
Davidsson-Lindmark-Olofsson 1994. Kirchhoff 1994, Johansson 2001). Davidsson-
Henrekson (2001) emphasized that the rate of new firm formation was a distinguishing 
feature of growing and stagnating economies and that the low rate of new firm 
establishment in Sweden was the most probable reason for the bad growth performance of 
the Swedish economy a conclusion IUI had already arrived at in 1993 in its Long Road to 
Recovery (Andersson et al 1993)   
Survival and Exit 
 
Baldwin-Rafiquzzaman (1995) study the relationship the quality of the initial entry 
selection and the later survival performance of the entry cohort. Three results stand out; 
First, the higher the entry rate the lower apparently the “ average” quality and the lower 
survival rates. Second, however, the higher the entry rate the higher the quality of the 
survivors and the faster the growth rate of survivors during the first ten years, as is also the 
growth rate of the entry cohort as a whole. Third, while the entry rate depends positively 
on the cost advantage of entrants over incumbents the more they are forced to learn the 
faster survivors grow.
7 Here Mata-Portugal-Guimares (1995), however, find that new 
plants are likely to survive longer if they have entered a growing industry or market with a 
lower entry activity, read with less competition. It is, however, important to keep the 
different partial hypotheses apart in a model to interpret the empirical results properly. In 
Brito-Mello (1995) a theoretical model is developed in which the information banks have 
on borrowing firms determine the terms on which they obtain credit. As banks learn about 
the firms, credit terms are also assumed to be eased. Banks furthermore are assumed to 
learn as the firm ages and grows. Hence, obviously for surviving firms the older and larger 
they are the faster they grow because of a better access to external finance on advantageous 
terms, everything else the same. 
It is still interesting to contrast these highly partial and theoretical results with the rough 
empirical results reported by Doms-Dunne- Roberts (1995). They find that the more 
capital-intensive and the more intensive in their use of advanced technology plants the 
faster growth and the less likely firms are to fail. These results are, however, very sensitive 
to the influence of size on growth, and only come out clearly if size is controlled for. When 
not controlled for the influence on growth is negative and tends to wash out the positive 
effects of technology. The real problem, however, appears when we try to digest the Doms 
et al (1995) and Brito-Mello (1995) articles simultaneously. First, a version of the Brito-
                                                 
6 We recognize this as an ambition that should be encouraged in each specialized field and observe that this 
was a main reason why Baumol and Reynolds two were awarded the International Prize in Entrepreneurship 
and Small Business Research by Swedish FSF and Nutek in 2003 and 2004 respectively. David Birch and 
Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch had received the same price already in 1996 and 2001, respectively. 
7 The question is whether this should be called learning. During the first year of life of a new firm fixed 
installation costs should dominate the cost structure and wages exceed labor productivity. We then rather 
have a case of excess capacity. As the new firm gets going that excess capacity should disappear and the true 
productivity potential of the new firm be revealed.    8
Mello model could have been fitted to the Doms et al data set and the empirical results 
would neither have been the predicted ones nor been interpreted the same way. Second, 
both models neglect a possible selection problem, namely that the Doms et al results may 
reflect a positive selection of technologically advanced firms that show superior growth 
performance irrespective of size. Once that selection has been made the Brito-Mello partial 
effects may click in empirically even though the Doms et al and Baldwin-Rafiqussaman 
results do not suggest that they will show up. 
 
On this, and to their surprise, Boeri-Bellmann (1995) find that exits do not increase in the 
cleansing destruction phase of the business cycle. While new firms tend to shut down when 
in cyclical trouble old firms rather contract, and the older firms get the more their 
performance follow business fluctuations. Hence, as the cohort grows older the exit rate in 
the business down swing decreases and the cohort firms increasingly swing with the cycle. 
On this Audretsch (1995) concludes that what happens after entry (post-entry) “ is at least 
as important as the entry itself”. Audretsch asks if entry as a growth contributing factor 
may be less interesting as entry as a disequilibrating factor changes the structure 
characteristics of production and the market. The question, however, is whether this is an 
interesting distinction to make in this context. Audretsch (2002) himself, Johansson (2001) 
and others have shown that much of growth of an industry can be directly attributed to new 
and small firms, but this, of course, is post-entry growth in those firms. In the longer run, 
as the surviving, once new firms prosper and grow while incumbents stagnate or disappear 
the once new firms will increasingly dominate both industry output and industry 
performance characteristics (Eliasson 1991b). Most of this influence, however, comes by 
way of the market disequilibrating influence of entering and growing firms, i.e. through 
competition through lower prices and better products.
8 
 
Old and large firms die more slowly than new and small firms.
9 This conventional 
understanding has survived for decades. Even though the death rate of old firms seems to 
be on the increase (Pratten 2004, Chapter 2 in this volume) the fates of new firms are 
particularly interesting from the point of view of understanding the nature of the EOE. 
New and small firms have smaller financial resources to burn to sustain a winning business 
experiment and (perhaps) less experience than the big firms, and the time dimension of the 
                                                 
8  The important role of new competition through new entry was apparent in the early simulation experiments 
on the MOSES model (Eliasson 1978a,pp 52ff) even though nobody found that interesting at the time. 
9 See for instance Audretsch-Mahmood 1994,1995. 
In the MOSES model of an EOE to be used below new entry is a random drawing from a distribution of firm 
performance characteristics which show a much broader spread in productivities, but a lower average than 
the corresponding distribution for incumbent firms (Granstrand 1986, Eliasson 1991b). This highlights the 
boundedly rational character of new entrants and the experimental nature of new entry, optimistic 
entrepreneurs who don’t know their capacity to perform compared to incumbent firms happily entering the 
market at great risks many of them facing immediate failure. Some of them are, however, winners and if they 
enter in sufficient number and if the environment in which they enter is sufficiently favorable to 
entrepreneurship they will eventually begin to make their marks on macro economic growth, as is 
demonstrated in Eliasson (1991b). 
These simulation results are compatible with the theoretical predictions of Jovanovic (1982), however, for 
very different reasons (See section 3 below). Andersson-Vejsin (2000) offer an alternative and what they 
consider neglected hypothesis, what they call the Solow vintage hypothesis, that recognizes the possibility of 
updating incumbent technologies rather than shutting down the plant. They also find econometric support for 
the hypothesis that the probability of plant failure increases with the age of the technology vintage and that 
plants that use high-quality human capital are more likely to exit than others.    9
birth, life and death cycle of a winning project appears to be much longer than the life 
cycle of the innovating, new firm. The risks are high for innovators, especially if they try 
their luck in bad entrepreneurial environments (See competence bloc analysis in Chapter 
X). Here Dunne-Roberts-Samuelson (1988) concluded that the characteristics of a firm at 
the time of entry still influenced the success of the business some 10 or 15 years after 
entry. 
Dunne-Klimek-Roberts (2003) conclude that “history plays an important independent role 
in conditioning the likelihood of survival“. Above all, they continue, the exit decision is 
not only conditioned by current and future “plant, firm, and market conditions”. 
Experienced plants that enter by diversifying their product mix have the highest exit rates 
in the sense of exiting a market, not necessarily closing a plant, followed by new, 
inexperienced entrants, and then new plants owned by inexperienced firms. The probability 
of manufacturing plant deaths (shut downs) appear to be higher in labor intensive 
production subjected to low-wage competition from abroad. Such shut downs occur more 
often, continue Bernard-Jensen (2002) at plants with a multi-plant firm and at plants 
recently subjected to change in ownership. Furthermore, plants “owned by U.S. 
multinationals are more likely to close” than other similar firms. This suggests, as we have 
argued (above and in Eliasson-Eliasson 2004) that reorganization, including shut-down is a 
management instrument.  
On the whole, in a historic perspective, and this takes us closer to our ultimate ambition to 
relate firm turnover to growth business shakeouts involving massive plant closures are part 
and parcel of the normal creation and establishment of an industry (Klepper-Miller 1995). 
 
Environment and New Firm formation  
Highfield-Smiley (1987) in their early study on the importance of environmental factors in 
new firm formation conclude surprisingly that individuals decide to found new firms when 
economic conditions, such as GNP growth, are sluggish and unemployment high, but that 
those who enter go for dynamic, technically progressive and profitable industries. 
There is also an entirely different and more eclectic institutional literature on long-term 
economic growth, beginning with North-Thomas (1970,1973) who argue that new firm 
formation and economic growth (The Industrial Revolution) came with the establishment 
of a functioning property rights system. More recently de Soto (1989, 2000) predicted the 
hopeless economic future of the non-western, notably socialist societies that have not got 
the institutions needed to turn assets into productive capital in order, notably the property 
rights. One instance of this is the common regulation of firm entry and prevention of exit 
in poor countries. Such regulation holds back competition, benefits incumbent failing 
firms, politicians and bureaucrats, promotes corruption and devastates the economy 
(Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes-Shleifer 2000). On this Posner (1975) argues that 
competition in the US to obtain a monopoly position means a transformation of expected 
monopoly profits into social costs. However, Posner argues, “ public regulation is probably 
a larger source of ( such ) social costs than private monopoly”. A particularly devastating 
such regulation is the legal provision of possibilities for interested parties to prevent the 
exit of firms that have no economic value. Carlsson (1983) have computed the enormous 
social costs associated with preventing the bankrupt Swedish shipyard industry from being 
effectively shut down. Eliasson-Lindberg (1981) also show that the large cost is not the 
originally sunk investment but the opportunity cost of operating the failed plant, depriving 
the market of a labor supply and driving up wages, thereby reducing growth elsewhere. On 
this Lim-Hahn ( 2003) demonstrate the beneficial economic effects of the South Korean   10
bankruptcy reform 1998 that removed the possibilities for interested parties , including 
labor unions and owners to prevent the closing of large failed firms.  
To conclude, the stylized facts are that rates of entry and exit develop parallel but vary 
between economies (Geroski 1995, Siegfried – Evans, 1994, Caves 1998). Furthermore, 
there is econometric evidence of rates of entry being dependent on rates of return in the 
firm and/or in the market entered but the evidence varies between studies. The reason for 
the absence of such relationships in some studies might be that entrants are generally 
overoptimistic and believe their technology to be superior to that of their incumbent 
competitors in the market and be independent of the situation at large in the market. In 
reality then, entry depends on expected profitability on the part of the entrant, which is 
difficult to measure. Highfield-Smiley (1987), however, believe that the lack of empirical 
support of this relationship in other studies ( for instance in the much quoted early Orr 
1974) depends on a “ lack of sophistication in modeling entrepreneurs´ expectations about 
future profit rates”. It is also hard to believe that there should be no relationship between 
the aggregate profitability situation in a market and the rate of entry in the same market. 
Most probably this is where one should begin to look for the absence of an econometric 
relationship. Stylized facts, in fact, are that entry increases and exit decreases with 
profitability and growth in the local markets (Siegfried – Evans 1994)
10.  
Another stylized fact is that the average performance of entrants is lower than that of 
incumbents but that the variation in performance in the entry sample is very much larger 
(Granstrand 1986). This would suggest that new establishment has a higher exit rate than 
older ones. This property, in a stylized way, is also part of the Jovanovic’s (1982) model 
and supported by Audretsch – Mahmood 1994, 1995 and Caves’ (1998) survey of 
empirical literature. For some, trained in standard micro production analysis this may seem 
counter intuitive, since for them old and obsolete plants should exit first. On this Honjo 
(2000) finds that new firms have greater difficulties surviving than old firms, notably in 
markets with a high entry rate and (therefore) intense competition. Age, however, also has 
a (linear) positive effect on business failure, but the square of age a negative effect. This 
non-linear effect means first positive and then (with age) negative effects of age on the 
failure rate. Audretsch (1995) observes that survival rates (over a decade) are lower in 
highly innovative than non-innovative markets, but entrants that have survived exhibit 
higher growth rates than other firms. This is also the result of Johansson (2001). Also 
Baldwin (1995) finds that firms that survive exhibit fast growth rates. Nevertheless, small 
firm entrants seem to be held back in concentrated markets, are competence intensive and 
“highly innovative”. The opposite appears to be the case for large-firm births, but together 
new firm entry should be an important competitive force in the industry (Acs – Audretsch 
1989). The higher exit rate of new firms than of incumbents has been demonstrated to be a 
property of the MOSES model and for exactly the reasons given above (Eliasson – Taymaz 
2000). 
                                                 
10 On this Ueda (2000) observes that output is positively correlated with profits in aggregate data, but not in 
sector data. This incompatibility with the neoclassical competitive equilibrium model Ueda explains by 
assuming that the “ sector’s incumbents have market power” and therefore lower profitability in growing 
markets to deter entry and protect their rents. 
On this already Geroski (1995) concluded among his stylized facts “ that entry is generally a poor substitute 
for active rivalry amongst incumbent firms in a market”. This may have been statistically so, but this does not 
mean that it is true. In some very early simulation runs on the MOSES model (Eliasson 1978a, pp.52ff) 
which on the basis of the Modigliani (1958) tradition were considered not interesting in a Swedish academic 
seminar at the time, we found that with a higher elasticity of entry with respect to local market profitability, 
and hence stronger entry (and hence also of exit) the market price level was competed down and industry 
growth expanded.   11
Generally speaking the direct effects of entry on aggregate output appear not to be large, 
and slow in coming (for a survey see Eliasson 1991b). The important long- term effects of 
new entry are indirect and systemic and are even slower in coming. To quantify them you 




3. Theoretical Prehistory 
 
The stylized facts have to be brought together in a consistent manner to help understanding 
the role of firm turnover in economic growth. You need a theory. But that theory has to 
give firm dynamics in markets an explicit role to play in the growth process. Let us see 
what we have. 
Early Awareness in Theory 
For a long time empirical researchers had felt content with ad hoc approaches and theorists 
had been reluctant to disturb the fix-point equilibrium properties of the mainstream model 
with the technical problems of taking on firm dynamics. Eventually, however, as empirical 
research grew more and more theoretically sophisticated and the documentation of 
empirical facts began to shake the very foundations of the mainstream model a neoclassical 
awakening has occurred and several recent studies within the so-called new growth theory 
movement, have addressed the phenomenon. They have even begun to use terms such as 
“Schumpeterian models”, “selection” and “creative destruction”. In these models, 
however, industries operate on their (well known) production possibilities frontiers the 
concept of a firm has no meaning and “price taking” is imposed by assumption. 
Furthermore, very special assumptions are needed (see e.g. Dasgupta – Stiglitz 1981, 
Jovanovic 1982, Aghion - Howitt 1992, etc.) to keep the economy in a standard Walrasian 
equilibrium. This means that these models only allow for the existence of entrepreneurs in 
such a restricted sense that it is wrong to refer to Joseph Schumpeter for intellectual 
support, especially to Joseph Schumpeter (1911). A theoretical point pursued in this paper 
is that firm dynamics and autonomous Schumpeterian (1911) entrepreneurs are not 
compatible with the standard notion of an exogenous equilibrium. An economic system is, 
of course, characterized by some kind of equilibrium properties but not a point or an 
exponential trajectory. Equilibrium should rather be characterized as a fairly wide region 
of (non-stochastic) variation and hence becomes more of a stability than an equilibrium 
concept (Eliasson 1983, 1984). The restrictions on autonomous entrepreneurial behavior 
imposed by the Walrasian equilibrium is then removed as they are in the Micro-to-Macro 
simulation model of an Experimentally Organized Economy we will be using. That model, 
furthermore, is theoretically compatible with the empirical models tested and reported on 
above and, hence, can be naturally related to the simulation analysis to come. The results 
can, furthermore, be compared with the simulated results from the model. 
But there is an early history of daring pioneers. Winter (1964) opened up with his thesis of 
Darwinian competition and selection and the theory of the firm. Already Jenner (1966) 
attempted both to expand the notion of entry and to introduce entry in the pure competition 
neoclassical model. Following Marshall (1919) he observed that a condition for 
competitive equilibrium in the neoclassical model is that no firm dominates the conditions 
under which a new product emerges. Hence Jenner makes product differentiation a 
necessary condition for product competition and concludes that monopolies may be created   12
internally (on the basis of product developments) in the competitive model, that they are 
not inconsistent with pure competition, since they are constantly controlled by competitive 
forces, and that they are in fact part of the competitive process. Jenner (1966) is 
Schumpeterian in spirit, but traditional and cautious in application. Stay within the 
mainstream model if you want to be published. Jenner’s spirit, however, was not 
compatible with the neoclassical model. Jenner (1966) furthermore was a precursor of the 
contestable market story of Baumol (1982) who faced the same problem and solved it by 
being as conservative. But Jenner’s (1966) analysis was more broadly conceived. He 
addressed actual competition through entry, not only potential competition and he brought 
the notion of competitive entry to within the firm. Part of Jenner’s analysis, therefore, 
emerges in the “ product selection, fixed cost” analysis of Spence (1976). By arguing that 
entry and market behavior are first and foremost a matter of product introduction, and only 
secondly a matter of new plant and firm establishment both Jenner (1966) and Spence 
(1976) argue that there is far more growth generating entry than revealed by new plant 
and firm entry (see further Eliasson 1991b). But both Jenner (1966) and Winter (1964) 
were too early for a conservative profession and they have largely disappeared from the 
reference lists of “ modern” economists addressing the same problems in similar ways. In 
fact, as we will see, both Jenner (1966) and Winter (1964) may still be ahead of the 
“moderns” in relevance.  
Literature offers three well known exogenous equilibrium approaches to the firm turnover / 
growth theme. We have (1) the Baumol (1982) contestable market story, the (2) neo 
Schumpeterian/neoclassical new growth model of Romer (1986) and Aghion-Howitt 
(1992) and (3) the Jovanovic-Pakes approaches. They are all neoclassical conservatives in 
tailoring their assumptions in order not to get out of exogenous equilibrium.  
Contestable markets 
 
The problem with entry and exit in exogenous equilibrium analysis is that there are 
transactions costs associated with the process and that the optimal production structure 
becomes dependent on these transactions costs. The standard solution is to assume 
transactions costs to be zero. Baumol-Panzar-Willig (1982) did that by assuming entry to 
be virtual, i.e. it never occurred. But since it could occur producers never extracted the 
monopoly rents possible in the absence of competitive entry. This assumption was of 
course, widely criticized as unrealistic, e.g. by Shepherd (1984). How can competitive 
entry that cannot occur ex post be credible.  
Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1981) tried a more clever trick by assuming zero transactions costs and 
that an exogenous inflow of best practice technology exactly replaces the relative cost 
structure of exiting low performance technologies. Under the assumed iso-elastic demand 
curve an exogenous long-run growth path driven by the difference in performance between 
entering and exiting technologies and independent of the “organization “ of production can 
be shown to exist. Here we can take note of the fact that du Rietz and Englund (1980) 
attempted to solve the same equilibrium problem using very similar assumptions
11.  
                                                 
11 In practice identical assumptions. Instead of making assumptions about the relative cost structure of 
entering and exiting firms Englund (1980) made the assumptions necessary to preserve price-taking behavior 
before and after entry on the same price vector. This meant that he had to derive the entry intensity 
compatible with that exogenous price vector to obtain the optimum equilibrium growth trajectory of the 
industry. Such assumptions may look more unrealistic than those of Dasgupta-Stiglitz, but mathematically 
they are identical. In fact, the Englund (1980) approach is also mathematically close to that of Jovanovic 
(1982).   13
Jovanovic-Lach (1989) use a more sophisticated solution to stay within exogenous 
equilibrium mathematics (See Eliasson 1991b). Their trick is to make the Arrow (1962) 
assumption of perfect foresight. Learning by doing then creates predictable differentiable 
qualities of agents. J-L observe that probit-type or epidemic models exhibit S-type 
diffusion paths of innovation if heterogeneity among adopters is assumed and continue to 
show that agents can acquire the needed heterogeneity through learning by doing. The cost 
advantages achieved are then appropriated by later entrants that drive down costs and 
prices and eventually also the temporary monopoly profits earned by the early entrants, 
who eventually exit. Hence, exogenous learning-by-doing cost reductions drive the model, 
which stabilizes, on an equilibrium entry path where entry is proportional to the current 
flow of profits. Investment in new technology is in turn proportional to the volume of 
innovative entry. J-L can then show that there is a trade-off between the higher margins for 
early entrants and the lower margins (lower unit costs) of later entrants. Since perfect 
foresight has been assumed an exogenous equilibrium growth path can be shown to exist. 
By assuming learning-by-doing to occur in the form of cost saving entry improvements J-L 
find that the monopolists – through innovating or entering early and appropriating cost 
savings - do better for social welfare if demand is sufficiently elastic than perfect 
competition does. They associate this result with Schumpeter, who, however, would not 
have recognized their model as related to his. Of course, also J-L (1989) assume zero 
transactions costs. 
 
New growth modeling 
While the theoretical role of entry in the static neoclassical model and the determinants of 
entry have been addressed, very little attention, perhaps none, has been paid to the role of 
entry and exit, or rather firm turnover in industrial dynamics and growth. The likely reason 
is the difficulties of accommodating firm turnover in the exogenous equilibrium 
neoclassical model. This is surprising since this model is by its very design not suitable for, 
and in fact misleading when used for analyzing the role of firm dynamics in 
macroeconomic change. So why should you use it? Hence, Eliasson (1991b) concludes, 
dynamic simulation modeling is the only reliable approach. Not everybody agrees with 
this, however. Aghion-Howitt (1992) use a so called new growth theory model to 
incorporate firm turnover in a macro economic growth model. Since they call it a model of 
“ creative destruction” a critical comment is warranted. The Aghion-Howitt model in fact 
carries a pedagogical value. Once you have looked through the elegant presentation it can 
be set in glaring contrast to our final model analysis. 
The A-H (1992) model draws directly on the Romer (1986,1990) so called new growth 
model literature. Investment in R&D is assumed to yield a random sequence of innovations 
(technologically defined) that creates a (temporary) monopoly sequence of rents that last 
until a new random sequence flow of innovations kills off the rents. The innovations, 
however, shift productivity upwards for ever, and there are no investment mistakes as far 
as can be understood from the paper. All markets are (assumed to be) perfectly 
competitive, except that for intermediate goods, or (in this case) innovations. Hence, the 
notion of a firm becomes irrelevant, even though the authors keep using the term. Also, 
there is the implicit assumption (not spelled out) that there are no transactions costs 
associated with the R&D, innovation supply and introduction process. Hence, perfect 
foresight rules, and a rational expectations type stationary exogenous equilibrium can be 
shown to exist. A small technical problem however, exists about how to deal with the not 
perfectly competitive intermediate market for innovations. To demonstrate the existence of 
an exogenous equilibrium A-H assume that wages for workers in that market are equal to   14
monopoly profits for innovations. Hence, total value created is always completely 
exhausted by payments to the factors of production. Creative destruction in the A-H model 
now becomes synonymous to the creation of new rents and the destruction of old 
innovation rents. All real activities are assumed to be independent of this stochastic rent 
creation and destruction, except, that the flow of innovations permanently upgrades 
productivity.
12 A.H (1992, 336) then show that the stochastic process driving output is non- 
stationary.
13 In principle the assumptions made are the same as those in Dasgupta-Stiglitz 
(1981). The A-H claim (on page 323) that this is endogenous growth generated by 
innovations that improve the quality of products is, however, a bit misleading. As in the 
MOSES model we will use this refer to they mean the quality of the one intermediate 
product. That intermediate product in turn affects the productivity of producing the 
perfectly homogenous final products of their model.   
 
The Jovanovic Approach 
 
Jovanovic (1982) offers a selection model of industry evolution based on Bayesian 
learning and (assumed) perfect foresight to explain observed “deviations from the 
proportional growth law”, i.e. that firm growth is independent of size, or a drawing from a 
lottery, first formulated by Gibrat (1930,1931) and empirically tested again by Simon-
Bonini (1958) and others. The policy implications of that law are far reaching. If true we 
don’t have to worry, as Schumpeter (1942) did, about inevitable firm concentration. 
Jovanovic (1982) offers a theory of “ noisy” selection to explain these deviations. To set 
the scene J. assumes an infinite number of firms (of “ zero measure”). Hence, no single 
firm can influence the exogenous output price and price taking behavior has been assumed. 
Firms are also assumed to know the entire “ equilibrium price sequence”. Each firm has a 
true performance parameter that it does not know, except that it is a drawing from a normal 
distribution the parameters, which it knows. The firm passively learns about its 
performance parameter with the passage of time. It maximizes its expected present value, 
given what it knows and J. goes on to demonstrate that a unique industry output 
equilibrium exist for the exogenous price sequence where the discounted sum of consumer 
and producer surpluses is maximized. Then the net present value of entry is zero or 
negative and doesn’t occur. The optimum situation is identical to that of the Walrasian 
model. One can talk about an auctioneer or central planner who “ has exactly the same 
information as is collectively available to firms” (op. cit. p.658). This central planner 
assigns the entry and exit and the output of each firm. There are no transactions costs and 
no business mistakes. The proof is complicated but in the end J. demonstrates that the 
infinitely small firms have higher and more variable growth rates than the infinitely small 
large firms, but that this property diminishes with size. There is, however, a selection bias 
to account for in the sense that small firms have a higher probability of failing (exiting) and 
that those exiting firms, because of their bad performance parameters, would have been 
slow growing if they had not exited. 
Mathematically the J-model can be seen as a filter fed with firms with a heterogeneous, to 
them unknown, performance potential by prior specification that gradually weeds out low 
                                                 
12 There is assumed to be no matching negative real effect of the rent destruction process. 
13 Mathematically this occurs for the following reason. Log income is enhanced through equally large 
innovations steps that, however, occur at different times determined by a Poisson process, see 2.1 and 2.3 on 
page 321.   15
performers and entering (by the same prior specification) low performers. This “ noisy” 
selection process, J. claims, generates output that accords with observed data. 
One could also conclude that firms in the J. model should be able to insure themselves 
from bad performance parameters on the fact that they know the normal distribution of the 
parameters, a conclusion Knight (1921) would not have been happy to see.   
Pakes-Ericson (1998) come up with a variation of the Jovanovic (1982) model, or rather 
two “ alternative models of firm dynamics”, one being based on the passive Bayesian 
learning device of Jovanovic (1982) the other on their own active R&D investment 
learning that upgrades the exploration of a given bounded, ordered and countable state 
space. Constant (exogenous) input prices are assumed and firms act “ so as to maximize 
the expected discounted value of future net cash flows conditional on current information” 
(op. cit. p.9). Since the profit flows are stochastic ex-ante (expected) profits and ex-post 
profits are identical in expectation.  
 
Firms, following Jovanovic (1982) are endowed at birth with a set of time-invariant and to 
them unknown parameters that determine the distribution of their profit streams. The firm, 
however, is assumed to know the distribution from which the value of its profit 
determining characteristic is drawn that determines its ex post profit outcome  
 
Under “ active learning” P-E firms can, in addition, invest in R&D and improve the value 
of the parameters which determines the distribution of its (ex post) profits. The effect of 
such investment on this parameter is stochastic, and (hence, our comment) does not 
conflict with the exogenous equilibrium of the model. 
The two models are built on the four primitives (assumptions); (1) a prior distribution of 
profits generating characteristics, call it initial conditions, (2) a sequence of random 
variables, (3) a family of distributions of these sequences, one for each characteristics and 
(4) a pay-off function. The pay-off function is very general (P-E 1995, p. 57) assuming 
only that “profits” depend positively on the relative performance (“productivity”) positions 
of the firm and negatively on the structure of the market (read: the number of competing 
firms).
14 Entry conditions in (P-E 1995, p. 57) are determined by the structure of the 
market, the initial investment requirements and a stochastic performance characteristic that 
is a drawing from a given (and known) distribution. Hence, entrants are given pay-off 
functions identical to the pay-off function of incumbent firms mentioned above. They 
differ, however, by their statistically determined performance. This is identical to the entry 
function in the MOSES model, except that new entrants in the P-E (1995) model first make 
the drawing from a known distribution and then know their performance for sure barring a 
stochastic error. MOSES firms have a prior perception of their performance, but the 
outcome depends on how they behave, given their characteristics (see Hanson 1989). 
 
Firms in the P-E 1995 model do not exit when they run out of net worth, or encounter an 
unacceptable profit situation as in the micro to macro model that we use in the next 
section, but stochastically according to an empirical hazard function that depends on firm 
performance characteristics. 
 
An important analytic result can be drawn from this presentation. Firm behavior is not 
experimental in the sense (of Eliasson 1992 and the Micro- to- Macro model of the next 
section and) that they enact strategic business experiments to be tested in the market. Firms 
cannot fail because of strategic business mistakes, only randomly. 
                                                 
14 Of the MOSES specification in Eliasson (1978), Hanson (1989, pp. 213-244) and Taymaz (1991a).     16
 
Pakes-Ericson (1998, p.4) argue that their models “ are “ complete” in the sense that if we 
were willing to specify functional forms for their primitives they would imply dynamic 
equilibrium which could, at least in principle, be computed and numerically analyzed ”. P-
E (1998) don’t do that, but they are probably right since the model implies (1) a bounded 
convex state space, (2) costless exploration and other transactions, (3) exogenously given 
prices and (4) a pay off function that short circuits all demand feed back. Simulating this 
model would probably make it converge on some kind of “ equilibrium” in the form of 
distributions of firm characteristics or perhaps a collapse of all structures. This simulation 
would not be technically uncomplicated and the outcome hardly interesting.  
The problem with all these sophisticated modeling efforts, however, is that by 
demonstrating theoretically that two exogenous entry flows are associated with two 
different exogenous equilibrium growth paths, growth has not been explained, at least not 
by the stylized facts reported from empirical studies. That explanation requires that firm 
behavior in dynamic markets or aggregation over dynamic markets is made explicit, the 
price taking assumption is given up and any equilibrium concept used is made dependent 
on market transactions cost (Day-Eliasson 1986). 
We agree with Jenner (1966) that the entry and exit process should be taken down to 
within the firm for a true representation of growth through the Schumpeterian creative 
destruction or Table 1. Hence, also mergers are part of the dynamics of resource 
reallocation (Eliasson–Eliasson 2002, Jovanovic-Rousseau 2002). This, however, makes 
both the distinction between the firm and the market, and the problem of determining the 
optimal allocation undetermined. We are confronted with a constantly ongoing 
experimental process.  
Non-stochastic business mistakes are not allowed in any of the above neoclassical models 
because part of the market transactions costs influences any equilibrium growth trajectory 
(Eliasson-Eliasson 2002). Also, even though the P-E models generate distributions of firms 
that can be tested against data, this dynamics” is not brought together in the form of 
industry or GNP growth trajectories. To capture this a different theory and a new concept 
of creative destruction is needed. Let us, therefore, give up the limiting assumptions of 
mainstream economics and turn to an entirely different model. 
 
 
4.  The Entry and Exit processes 
 
Firm turnover involves innovative entry, learning and imitation, enforced reorganization 
and competitive exit, together making up the Schumpeterian creative destruction process of 
Table 1. This process, which is explicit in the micro macro simulation model MOSES may 
or may not generate macroeconomic growth, depending on economic circumstances 
endogenous in the model. 
 
   (Table  1  in  about  here) 
 
Economic Growth through Competitive Selection 
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One could say that the four mechanisms of Schumpeterian Creative Destruction in Table 1 
updates a set of performance characteristics represented each period through the rankings 
of as many Salter curves (see Figure 2). Under positive circumstances (incentives, 
competition, competence) the Salter curves are shifted outwards. Economic growth occurs. 
This positive outcome is, however, not guaranteed. Circumstances might be negative and 
destruction dominate. Stagnation might follow instead.  
Incentives and competition based on the institutions of the economy guide this selection 
process and decide whether investment and growth or concentration and eventual 
stagnation will occur. Firms are guided in their investment decisions by the expected return 
to capital over and above the market interest rate. The key problem of growth is (Eliasson 
2001, 2003) that winners are identified and carried on to industrial scale production and 
distribution.  
Short term production decisions are guided by a criterion called Maintain or Improve 
Profits (MIP). Firms constantly climb expected profit hills that change from period to 
period because of the ongoing climbing traffic and keep recalculating their expected profits 
as circumstances change and as they learn from experience (Eliasson 1976, p.236 f, 291f, 
1977, 1991a). The more expectational mistakes the firms make the more cautious they 
become. Since the state space or the opportunities space of the MOSES model keeps 
expanding as it is being explored by firms (the Särimner effect, Eliasson 1987, p 29, and 
1996, p.27f) behavior can be characterized as profit hill climbing in a volcanically 
unstable landscape, in which eruptions are constantly being triggered by the ongoing 
climbing traffic.  
 
   (Figure  1  in  here) 
 
The concepts of entry and exit 
The concepts of entry and exit are well defined in the MOSES model as “whole” firms that 
enter or leave. Also factors of productions used in exiting firms (labor and machines) are 
recycled over the market to other firms. In reality, however, entry and exit take on more 
diverse forms. Jenner (1966), in fact, wanted to see the launching of a new product as a 
new entry, and firms may acquire parts of other firms, or spin off parts of itself as new 
entrants. Strategic acquisitions and divestures have become an increasingly important 
phenomenon in industrial dynamics (Eliasson-Eliasson 2004). Similarly, the shutting down 
of a factory as well as the termination of a product line in a big firm should count as exit. 
This is perfectly compatible with our theory as expressed in Table 1, but such a fine 
statistical resolution takes us beyond availability of data, even though some empirical 
studies look at corporate spin-offs (e.g. Du Rietz 1975). 
The actual occurrence of the phenomenon becomes difficult to define on the exit side. A 
complete reorganization of a firm with many subsidiaries, including divestures and new 
acquisitions should count as a complex entry and exit process, and may to some extent 
appear in statistics as the disappearance of old, and the opening up of new firm 
identification numbers. Only part of this activity will, however, be captured statistically. 
The MOSES model, as it is currently constructed cannot deal with this. 
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In this analysis we use the following entry rate specification.  
Entry = s(α,π) 
where s(.) is a stochastic function, α is the exogenous entry parameter, and π the average 
rate of return in the appropriate market. 
We assume a uniform distribution of size around the average entry size that is assumed to 
be less than the average of incumbents. In our experiments the size of new entering firms 
can vary from five percent of the average size of incumbents (in terms of number of 
employees) to 25 percent. Hence, the average size of entrants is around 15 percent of the 
average size of incumbents. 
Firm performance is measured by labor and capital productivity (called TEC and INVEFF 
respectively in the model) and by the rate of return. To specify the characteristics of new 
firms we use the observation (Granstrand 1986) that average labor productivity of a sample 
of new firms is lower than the same average of incumbent firms. Soon data will be 
available to tell how much lower and how the distribution of the sample of entrants differs 
from that of the population of incumbent firms. 
In the first experiment below we have set the size of the average firm entrant (large 
entrants) at 15 percent of the average incumbent measured by labor employed. The new 
data becoming available suggests that this is somewhat large for Sweden with its very large 
firms. The average size of an entrant in engineering industry should rather be somewhere 
between 5 and 10 percent. 
It is, however, not possible to induce the high rates of entry that we need to destabilize the 
price system endogenously through indirect incentives only. Hence, the very high rates of 
entry in some experiments have been exogenously imposed by changing the characteristics 
of the entering firms and modifying the stochastic algorithms that determine the rate of 
arrival of new entrants. 
In the entry experiments, the value of the exogenous entry parameter, α, has been 
increased gradually to test for the effects of the entry rate on long-run macroeconomic 
performance. The size of new firms in terms of the number of employees is drawn 
randomly from a uniform distribution. As mentioned, the boundaries of the distribution are 
set at the 5 percent (lower limit) and 25 percent (upper limit) of the average size of the 
incumbent firms. 
The technological characteristics of the new firms are also determined randomly, using 
genetic algorithms (see further Ballot – Taymaz 1998). There are 100 technologies that 
firms can learn about, recombine and use. These technologies are indexed from 1 to 100 by 
ascending technological level. The probability that the i
th firm will enter with technology j 




ij = f(|j-Tave|, pj) 
 
where Tave is the average technological level for all firms in the market and pj the 
proportion of incumbent firms using technology j. In other words, new firms tend to enter 
with technologies that are close to the market average and adopted by many firms. 
However, it is still probable that a new firm may enter with the best technology, i.e. 
technology 100. Therefore, entry encourages diversity that is likely to include better 
technologies. On the other hand, increasing returns to adoption generated by the imitation   19
process force firms to cluster around the same technology, and reduces diversity. The entry 
process, therefore, has a tendency to raise the rate of technological change by creating 
diversity, but it also causes reallocation of resources towards, in some cases, low tech new 
firms (see Ballot – Taymaz 1998). 
 
The role of exits 
The exit process is more easy to specify. It is fully endogenized and occurs when firms 
have been experiencing a bad profit development for considerable time. The model allows 
for a continuum of exit behavior between fast exit when a firm has had a recorded 
profitability below targets for a number of years and, at the other end, and at the latest 
(slow exit) when net worth has vanished. This means that the exit rate might be negatively 
correlated with the general profitability in the market (which in fact has been 
econometrically established to be the case, Siegfried – Evans 1994) because firms 
operating in low-profit markets generally tend to show lower profitability. Exit, hence, can 
be slow or more or less fast. Exit can be forced by competition and competition is 
enhanced by the entry of superior firms. 
The positive macroeconomic effects of a faster exit rate may demand a separate 
explanation. How come the disappearance of firms adds to output? This paradoxical effect 
is generated in a highly non-linear fashion over the longer run, but only under particular 
circumstances, i.e. it is positive if released resources are reallocated to growing firms, and 
the more so the more productive the receiving firm and the less productive the 
disappearing firms. We have an example of the macroeconomic output effects of dynamic 
resource allocation. This effect is difficult to demonstrate econometrically on the short 
time series data available. We have not seen any references to such a study. It has been 
demonstrated to be a property of the MOSES model by Eliasson – Taymaz (2000). The 
clear result of that study was that a long term, positive outcome of entry required a 
significant exit rate and a fast reallocation of labor over the market. Furthermore, as we 
will soon see, the experimental design that generated the negative long-run effects of fast 
entry was a slowing of the exit process.  
Exit, hence, is an integral part of the firm entry and reorganization process that together 
define Schumpeterian creative destruction. Exit is necessary to release resources for non-
inflationary new firm formation and growth. Exit is a natural consequence of the business 
mistakes that occur constantly in the model of the experimentally organized economy. 
Stable macroeconomic growth, however, requires some balance between entry and exit 
frequencies. 
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4.  Results from simulations 
Each experiment is rerun by gradually increasing the entry parameters. The curve shows 
the average value of GNP in the experiments, and the trend line shows the regression 
“curve” estimated by regressing the GNP level on a quadratic function of the entry 
parameter. 
Figure 6A shows the entry rate. The entry rate is defined as the proportion of net entrants  
at the end of the simulation (year 75). As may be expected, the entry rate increases almost 
monotonically by the value of the entry parameter to reach some 80 percent. Figure 6B 
shows the effects of the entry parameter on the exit rate that is defined as the ratio between 
the number of exits and the number of firms at the beginning of the simulation (there are 
225 firms at year 0). As expected, the entry rate also increases the exit rate because of the 
tough competition it imposes in the markets.
15 
Experiments run (by quarter) for 75 years. Micro relationships are partly determined 
econometrically. The model is, furthermore, based on a separate firm survey carried out by 
the Federation of Swedish industries since 1975 (see Albrecht 1992). The remaining 
parameters in the model have been calibrated on historic data (see Albrecht et al. 1992, and 
Taymaz 1991b). The parameters in the entry function are moved such that the entry rate is 
steadily increased. The exit rate is completely endogenized, but faster and slower exit can 
be specified in terms of the criteria model firm management applies to close down a firm. 
The endogenized balance between entry and exit is shown in Figures 6. To demonstrate the 
change over from the approximately linear to the non-linear macroeconomic response to 
firm turnover we present four sets of figures showing the GNP levels after 15, 35, 55 and 
75 years respectively (Figures 2, 3, 4, 5A). For 75 years also manufacturing output is 
shown (Figure 5B). 
Up to 15 years the levels of GNP increase proportionally with the rates of entry (and exit, 
Figure 2). Decreasing returns to further entry begin to show as a small down-bending of 
the trend curve after 35 years, which becomes pronounced after 55 years and very striking 
at 75 years both for GNP and manufacturing output. The downward bending at year 75 
also comes at a lower turnover rate than at years 31 and 55. 
 
      (Figures 2, 3, 4, 5A, B and 6A, B in about here) 
 
For our purposes it is sufficient to establish the existence of this non-linear negative effect 
under the dynamic assumptions of the simulation. The negative effects take a long time in 
coming but the final surge can become very strong. 
It is not meaningful at this stage to draw any further quantitative conclusions: for practical 
reasons the number of firms populating the model is only a tiny fraction of the number of 
firms of the real Swedish economy. The scales of the entry, exit and entry parameters in 
Figures 6 do not say anything about the rate at which firms are turned over per period or 
year. We can observe that there is a parallel increase in the entry and exit rates, as 
expected. The long-term growth to the 75-year horizon peaks at an entry parameter 
between 100 and 150. At that turnover level some 60 percent of the end population of 
firms are new. Many new entrants, however, have exited during the 75-year period. The 
                                                 
15 This effect has been a property of the model through all its versions. See Eliasson 1978, pp. 52 ff.   21
exit rate in the C&C industry is, in fact, very high. Johansson (2001) finds that only 60 
percent of the original number of firms remains after 5 years.
 16 
On the exit side (Figure 6B) long-term (75 years) output peaks when exits number some 
43-44 percent of the initial (year 0) population of 225 firms. While both the number of 
entrants and exits increases, the number of entrants is much larger than the number of 
exits. On the entry side, the “optimal” number in the model simulation amounts to some 
1.1 percent of the stock of firms per year, which is slightly above the average of just below 
1 percent in the 1970s and 1980s in Swedish manufacturing (Andersson et al. 1993, p. 95). 
We have no corresponding exit data and apparently the exit rate simulated is much lower 
(Figure 6C). We can only say that if the scale would be calibrated to the level of the real 
economy the proportion of firms replaced through Schumpeterian creative destruction each 
period would be very large as you go to the right in Figures 6. There is, however, the 
possibility, indicated earlier in the text, that the strong negative bend on the growth curve 
at high rates of entry after 50 years depends on a too low exit rate (unbalanced turnover) 
and would go away if we speed up the rate of exit by making management more profit 
conscious. This experiment has not been run but the hypothesis indicated will be tested 
later. Hence, the extreme bending down in Figures 5A, B may be extremely unlikely in 
reality because such high entry rates rarely occur for such long periods. But the effect is 
there to show. To capture it in a time series analysis on entry, exit and growth rates, 
generated by the model over a 75 year period, a very different model than the standard 
linear regression model would, however, be needed.  
                                                 
16 This is subject to a separate analysis in which the C&C industry is introduced as a separate industry/market 
in the MOSES model. 
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5. Concluding  policy  discussion 
 
Literature increasingly reports on a strong econometric support for a positive linear 
relationship between entry and growth and also on a positive influence on production 
growth of a balanced entry and exit process. Firm turnover, however, involves structural 
change and above some limit the rate of structural change will begin to affect the reliability 
of price signaling in markets negatively. To test for a long-run, non-linear negative 
influence of a very fast and (perhaps) unbalanced firm turnover process very long time 
series data that are not available are needed. Simulation has been the only way of 
establishing the possible existence of this phenomenon. It may even be so that the firm 
turnover rate needed to generate disturbances in the price system has to be so extreme that 
it “cannot occur” endogenously in reality. If so, the negative relationship will never be 
observable. The micro-to-macro model of the Swedish economy is found to embody the 
expected non-linear characteristics and for the reasons hypothesized. The output growth 
curve began to bend down after about half a century at entry rates that were not far above 
recorded entry rates during the past 20 years.  
 
Long-term sustained, fast and stable growth in macro economic output is a desired 
ambition of industrial policy. We can say that the simulation experiments reported on 
directly perform the transformation of Table 1 into industrial macro change, firms being 
guided in their production decisions by a profitability criterion called maintain or Improve 
Profits (MIP). Growth occurs if winning projects/firms are opting for investment and 
growth and losers are contracting or shutting down. This ideal emergence may not always 
be the outcome, however. Long – term investment decisions in MOSES firms are guided 
by the expected return to capital over the market interest rate. The MIP criterion accepts 
that firms are temporarily inferior performers by that rate of return criterion, but force them 
to constantly improve their performance. Hence, if firms cannot meet their own short-term 
profit standards they may decide to contract operations rather than invest and expand. In 
this particular set of experiments unreliable price signaling in markets may lead both to 
mistaken production and investment decisions and tilt an increasing number of firms onto a 
lower than possible growth path. Similarly, unbalanced growth, with too few exits may 
raise factor prices and tilt expansive firms onto lower growth paths.
17 
We have demonstrated in this paper that faster for some time may mean significantly less 
later, at a stage when it may be impossible to correct the situation. Sustainability involves 
an “optimization” over a very long time span. An interesting question is if the policy maker 
should have a role in that optimization decision. The first problem to solve, then, is to 
figure out the reasons for the long-run negative effect of fast turnover on growth. Wouldn’t 
the economy have developed endogenous market correction mechanisms that eliminate 
such long-run effects? First of all, the negative effects take a long time in coming. They 
cannot be discovered ahead of time by analytical methods
18 so there is no opportunity for 
policy makers to act ahead with precise targeting of counter measures. Second, even if they 
had known what was coming, policy makers would not know what to do (Eliasson – 
Taymaz 1992). Third, the low entry rates per year should be seen in relation to the total 
firm population. The model firm population features much less heterogeneity than the real 
                                                 
17 These negative effects on growth came out clearly in early model experiments on the Swedish subsidy 
program. See Carlsson (1983). 
18 This is a property of chaotic behavior.   23
firm population. Hence, it is not as robust and the downward bending of the curve should 
occur at a lower entry rate than in reality. Accounting for that one might perhaps say that 
the large entry rates to the right in Figure 6A, involving a very large increase in the firm 
population are not sustainable for an entire economy for such a long period, only locally 
and then the realistic range of entry over a long period would be just above or just below 
the optimum, but not so far off. Then negative effects may go undiscovered for decades. 
This interpretation is more in line with the Swedish experience with a steady lowering of 
new firm formation per year from a peak around 3 percent in the 1920s to a low around 0.5 
percent in the 1990s (Andersson et al. 1993, p. 95). To present a negative employment 
effect from the increasingly obsolete industrial structure the exit process was slowed by 
subsidies, adding worse to bad, notably by subsidizing the worst performers that were also 
paying the highest wages (steel and shipyards; Carlsson 1983). The negative influences 
began to show and be understood only as late as the early 1990s. In fact, Andersson et al. 
(1993) presented the first real analysis of the Swedish economy in which this problem was 
seriously addressed.    24
Table 1.  The four mechanisms of Schumpeterian creative destruction and economic 
  growth 
1. Innovative  entry 




4.  Exit (bankruptcy and/or shut down) 
Source: “Företagens, institutionernas och marknadernas roll i Sverige”, Appendix 6 in A. Lindbeck (ed.), 
Nya villkor för ekonomi och politik (SOU 1993:16) and G. Eliasson (1996a, p. 45). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Salter curves showing labor productivities in Swedish manufacturing 1991,1993 
and 1997 
 
Note: The black and white columns show the shifting of positions between the three years of two real firms 
in the MOSES Data Base. 
The 1991 and 1993 curves have been used for calibrating the model. The 1997 Salter curve, divided up on 
five markets, is part of the new micro data base used to initialize a new MOSES version for 1997. See further 
Eliasson-Johansson-Taymaz (2004). 
Figure 2.  End of 15 year manufacturing output levels for different entry rate 
specification. 
 
Figure 3.  End of 35 year manufacturing output levels for different entry rate 
specification. 
 
Figure 4.  End of 55 year manufacturing output levels for different entry rate 
specification. 
 
Figure 5A. End of 75 year manufacturing output levels for different entry rate 
specification. 
 
Figure 5B. End of 75 year manufacturing output levels for different GNP levels. 
 
Figure 6A. Number of net (surviving) entrants in percent of 75 end-year population of 
firms for different entry specifications. 
 
Figure 6B. Number of exits during 75-year simulations in percent of initial number of 
firms. 
 
Figure 6C. Number of entrants and exits per year in percent of stock of firms (number) for 
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